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Shook: Litigation, Regulation, and Legislation Strategies to
Better Protect Oklahoma’s Earthquake Insurance
Policyholders
The relatively recent and increasingly frequent rash of earthquakes
plaguing the state has shaken Oklahomans and their insurers. While the
number of Oklahoma residents with earthquake insurance policies and
endorsements has risen with the occurrence of seismic activity, this emerging
market for insurers is under-regulated and provides scant protection for
policyholders.1 Much litigation in the arena of Oklahoma’s earthquakes has
been devoted, with varying degrees of success, to direct challenges from
property owners against the oil and gas operations believed to be responsible
for the induced earthquake outbreak in the state.2
While individuals seem willing to bring this fight, insurers have been
notably absent.3 Though insurance companies have the legal right to seek
compensation from a source of the damage through the doctrine of
subrogation,4 they have thus far been unwilling to enforce this right. Instead,
they have left their insureds with shocking claim denial rates.5 Accordingly,
Oklahoman insureds have been left to their own devices in remedying the
damages resulting from the state’s earthquakes. This Comment will argue
that a combination of litigation, regulation, and legislative action will better
hold absent insurers accountable during this unprecedented time in the state’s
history.
After briefly explaining the development of Oklahoma’s earthquake crisis,
Part I of this Comment will argue that the state’s earthquake insurance
policyholders would be better served at this time by pursuing litigation
against their insurers rather than the oil and gas industry itself. Specifically,
this Comment will highlight and advocate for the use of the often-overlooked
doctrine of illusory insurance coverage as a potential source of relief. Part II
will assert that while the Oklahoma Insurance Department and its
Commissioner have taken valuable steps towards recognizing a lack of
accountability from insurers handling earthquake claims, more stringent
regulation under the Commissioner’s authority and the Unfair Claims
1. Michael Thrasher, Oklahoma Insurance Regulators Still Face an Unprecedented
Risk, FORBES (July 28, 2016, 4:05 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthrasher/
2016/07/28/oklahoma-insurance-regulators-still-face-an-unprecedented-risk/#3e6d0b851536
(“More Oklahomans are buying earthquake insurance than ever before . . . .”).
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See infra Section I.B.
5. See infra Section I.B.
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Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA) is necessary. Finally, Part III will contend
that the Oklahoma Legislature should establish a state-managed earthquake
insurance authority, similar to the authority established by California in
response to the infamous Northridge Earthquake of 1994.6 Because litigation
is the most readily available of these proposed solutions for Oklahoma’s
policyholders, this Comment will spend the better part of its text addressing
this avenue. To most effectively protect Oklahomans with earthquake
insurance, however, its citizens and officials should confront each of these
three facets—litigation, regulation, and legislation—contemporaneously.
Preface: A Brief History of Oklahoma’s Earthquakes
While the earthquake outbreak across the South and Midwest is a recent
phenomenon,7 some scholarship has already addressed emerging legal and
environmental issues presented by the outbreak.8 That scholarship, however,
has focused mainly on the underlying causes and development of earthquakes
throughout states, including Oklahoma.9 Although this Comment primarily
focuses on the insurance industry’s response—or lack thereof—to the
pandemic, some explanation of the likely tie between these earthquakes and
the oil and gas industry provides a necessary context for this Comment.
There remains little scientific doubt that oil and gas operations have
induced the seismic activity permeating Oklahoma.10 Early causal studies of
increased earthquakes focused largely on hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”)
practices but yielded little evidence connecting fracking to earthquakes and
6. The Northridge Earthquake was the most destructive earthquake in California since
1906 and the costliest ever. Northridge Earthquake of 1994, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Northridge-earthquake-of-1994 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
7. See New Earthquake Hazards Program: Lists, Maps, and Statistics, USGS, https://
www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-hazards/lists-maps-and-statistics (last visited Feb.
25, 2020) (denoting an almost 50% decrease in earthquakes in Oklahoma between 2011 and
2012, followed by a 300% increase in the number of earthquakes between 2012 and 2013, a
560% increase between 2013 and 2014, and a 150% increase in earthquakes between 2014
and 2015).
8. See, e.g., Darlene A. Cypser & Scott D. Davis, Liability for Induced Earthquakes, 9
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 551 (1994); Lucas Satterlee, Comment, Injecting Earthquakes into the
Energy Debate, 34 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221 (2016).
9. See Cypser & Davis, supra note 8.
10. According to the USGS, Oklahoma “has the most induced earthquakes in [the] US,”
with only 1% to 2% linked to hydraulic fracturing. Earthquake Hazards: Induced
Earthquakes, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-hazards/inducedearthquakes?qt-science_support_page_related_con=4#qt-science_support_page_related_con
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
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earth shifting.11 As the frequency of earthquakes intensified, so too did the
research into the underlying causes. Oklahoma quickly rose through the ranks
of earthquake-prone states, reporting double the earthquakes of California in
2014 before “becom[ing] the most seismically active state in the country” in
2015.12 In that same year, after much public debate and deliberation, the
Oklahoma Geological Survey declared the primary cause of seismicity to be
the injection of wastewater associated with oil and gas production.13 This
evidentiary connection explained the proliferation of earthquakes throughout
the state, specifically the even higher cluster of quakes near Jones, Oklahoma,
a town located in the crosshairs of four wastewater injection wells.14
The scientific, commercial, and legislative community in Oklahoma is
actively debating and implementing strategies to curb the use of wastewater
injection wells and mitigate the harm resulting therefrom. 15 Professor Monika
Ehrman of the University of Oklahoma College of Law has published an
overview of these attempts and their corresponding scientific rationales.16 As
a result of this general scholarly consensus on induced quakes, the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission has taken and continues to take action limiting
wastewater and injection well activities. 17 These solutions may better protect
Oklahoma’s environment and prospectively address earthquake-related
injury, but because these programs largely ignore the insurance industry, a
gap in the scholarship exists regarding available redresses for insured
Oklahomans seeking to repair earthquake damage.

11. Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory and Legal Issues
Arising Out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 612
(2017) (citing Matt Smith & Thom Patterson, Debate over Fracking, Quakes Gets Louder,
CNN (June 15, 2012, 3:28 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/us/frackingearthquakes/index.html).
12. Id. (citing Paul O’Donnell, Days After Oklahoma Earthquake, Sierra Club Lawsuit
Targets Chesapeake, Devon, and Others, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016, 9:51 AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/2016/02/17/days-after-oklahoma-earthquakesierra-club-lawsuit-targets-chesapeake-devon-others/); see also Blake Watson, Hydraulic
Fracturing and Tort Litigation: A Survey of Landowner Lawsuits, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct.
2017, at 10, 14 (noting that, in 2015, Oklahoma averaged 2.5 seismic events per day).
13. Ehrman, supra note 11, at 639.
14. Id. at 624–25.
15. See id. at 638–41.
16. Id.
17. See Press Release, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, OCC Announces Next Step in Continuing
Response to Earthquake Concerns (July 17, 2015), https://occeweb.com/News/DIRECTIVE2.pdf (suggesting a gradual curb in wastewater activity, particularly in areas near active or
triggered fault lines).
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Where there are human-made harms, there inevitably spring lawsuits
seeking compensation. Tort litigation surrounding induced earthquakes has
already developed in at least twelve states, the bulk of which have centered
around seismic activity in Texas, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, West Virginia, and
Oklahoma.18 University of Dayton Law School’s Professor Blake Watson has
detailed the range of this litigation, all of which seems to focus on the oil and
gas corporations allegedly responsible for the claimed harm.19 Plaintiffs have
alleged claims for a variety of torts, spanning from nuisance to property
damage.20 Invariably, these suits have led to a battle over causation. Most
typically, and especially in litigation involving property damage, oil and gas
defendants “deny that their disposal operations either caused the earthquakes
in question or were the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.”21 Indeed, the
question of proximate cause is the crux of these cases, and despite the general
scientific consensus on the link between wastewater injection and
earthquakes, the results of these claims have been mixed.22
Because plaintiffs in these cases must prove not only general causation,
but also a specific operation which created the harm at issue (for example:
“waste well X caused damage Y”),23 individual plaintiffs often face an uphill
battle. This Comment suggests that plaintiffs can altogether forego this
causation dispute by focusing their attention on insurers, who, unlike gas
companies, owe a fiduciary duty to their policyholders.24 If such litigation
were to hold insurers to account for their unprecedentedly high denial rates
for earthquake claims in Oklahoma, the insurers themselves may be
prompted to hash out the causation issue with the oil and gas industry on a
macro level, through subrogation.25
18. Watson, supra note 12, at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 15.
22. See id. at 14–15.
23. Id. at 15 (“But, even if landowners are not required to establish fault (no pun
intended), they will still be required to prove causation. This may be an insurmountable
problem for two reasons: first, not all earthquakes are ‘induced’; and second, induced
seismic activity is not easily linked to particular injection wells or to particular
defendants.”).
24. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶ 32, 577 P.2d 899, 905
(holding that insurers are “under a legal duty to act in good faith and deal fairly” with their
policyholders).
25. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “subrogation” as “[t]he substitution of one party for
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to rights, remedies, or securities
that would otherwise belong to the debtor.” Subrogation, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
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I. Earthquake Litigation in Oklahoma and the Role of the Courts in
Protecting Earthquake Insurance Policyholders
Complex litigation (either through mass joinder or class actions) relating to
the Oklahoma earthquakes has thus far exhibited only a tangential
relationship to insurance carriers. These attempts at large-scale litigation have
pursued a variety of theories but yielded a mixed-bag of results.26 Although
these cases have generally ignored insurers, they still contextualize the ability
of mass litigation to address Oklahoma’s earthquake problem. Moreover, the
shared difficulties of this litigation make even clearer why plaintiffs may be
more successful in pursuing claims against insurance carriers, which in turn
could take the fight to the powerful oil and gas industry. All of this litigation,
massive or otherwise, was set in motion by a 2015 decision from Oklahoma’s
highest court.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court opened the door to earthquake-related tort
claims with its decision in Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC.27 Ladra presented
an opportunity for the state’s high court to weigh in on the state’s seismic
shake-up for the first time.28 The plaintiff in Ladra certainly suffered some of
the most severe injuries in any of the Oklahoma earthquake litigation; a 5.0
magnitude earthquake struck Sandra Ladra’s home in Prague, Oklahoma,
causing far more than property damage.29 Intense shaking collapsed Ladra’s
fireplace, sending stone tumbling, pinning down Ladra’s legs and knees. 30
Seeking compensation for her medical expenses, Ladra brought suit for
compensatory and punitive damages, claiming the waste well disposal
practice of New Dominion, LLC was the proximate cause of her injuries. 31
The extremity of this harm may well have caught the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s attention, but it also allowed them to catalyze a new segment of the
state’s tort law.32

26. See Watson, supra note 12, at 14–15 (providing a summary of cases filed in
Oklahoma).
27. 2015 OK 53, 353 P.3d 529.
28. See id. ¶ 2, 353 P.3d at 530 (“Since approximately 2009, Oklahoma has experienced
a dramatic increase in the frequency and severity of earthquakes.”).
29. Id. ¶ 3, 353 P.3d at 530.
30. Id.
31. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 353 P.3d at 530.
32. The Ladra case quickly garnered national attention as a bellwether for Oklahoma
earthquake litigation. See Miguel Bustillo & Daniel Gilbert, Energy’s New Legal Threat:
Earthquake Suits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2015, 1:22 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
frackings-new-legal-threat-earthquake-suits-1427736148.
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The district court originally dismissed the Ladra case in deference to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC), holding that the OCC
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any case involving oil and gas
operations.33 The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed and distinguished that
while the OCC does retain exclusive jurisdiction over “the resolution of
public rights,” the commission holds no authority over disputes between two
or more private persons.34 Because this decision instructed that district courts
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over private tort actions even “when regulated
oil and gas operations are at issue,” the court set the stage for the future of
earthquake litigation.35
A. Oklahoma Earthquake Mass Litigation So Far
While Ladra authorized the beginning of most earthquake litigation in the
state, mass-scale litigation in the area has generally struggled. A brief survey
of these cases reveals a relatively unbroken chain of failures. Sierra Club v.
Chesapeake Operating, LLC is the first of these unsuccessful attempts.36
Sierra Club brought its multi-party claim not through the typical means of
mass joinder or a Rule 23 class action, but through a specific provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 37 which allows for private parties
to sue any person “who ‘has contributed . . . to the . . . disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.’”38 Pursuant to this Act, Sierra
Club sought an order from the court requiring an array of oil and gas
companies within Oklahoma to reduce the amount of wastewater they
injected into the ground, while also establishing an earthquake monitoring
center which would study the relationship between specific wells and
corresponding quakes.39 Despite the then-recent Ladra ruling allowing for
individual claims to proceed beyond the purview of the OCC, the Western
District of Oklahoma dismissed this case before it ever gained traction.40
The Western District recognized its jurisdiction over the injunctive relief
sought but chose to decline that jurisdiction in deference to the OCC.41 Citing
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Ladra, ¶ 4, 353 P.3d at 530.
Id. ¶ 10, 353 P.3d at 531.
Id. ¶ 13, 353 P.3d at 532.
248 F. Supp. 3d 1194 (W.D. Okla. 2017).
Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1201 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2018)).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1202–04.
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the Burford abstention doctrine, which allows federal courts to decline
jurisdiction in cases that implicate complex questions of state law and public
policy,42 the court chose to exercise “the power to dismiss” the case at
summary judgment.43 Accordingly, the first attempt at mass-scale litigation
relating to Oklahoma’s earthquakes came to an early end. Though the court
certainly had the option to allow the litigation to advance past the initial factfinding stage, it felt “ill-equipped to outperform the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission in advancing [the] science” necessary to resolve Sierra Club’s
environmental concerns as pleaded.44 If Ladra showed potential for litigation
as a tool for combatting the state’s earthquake problem, Sierra Club warned
of the difficulty in implementing such litigation on a complex, multi-party
scale.
The struggle of multi-plaintiff earthquake litigation at the federal level
continued in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.45 Meier appears to be the
only earthquake-related class action attempted in the state with even a
tangential relationship to the insurance industry. Plaintiffs in Meier sought
compensation for their earthquake insurance payments, not from the insurers
themselves, but from the oil and gas companies who allegedly necessitated
the need for homeowners’ earthquake insurance. 46 Although this action
originally began in the District Court of Payne County (a hotbed of seismic
activity), defendants quickly removed the case to the Western District of
Oklahoma (coincidentally before the same judge as Sierra Club) pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act.47 Meier recognized that property owners in
seismically active areas felt compelled to purchase earthquake insurance
coverage with surprisingly high premiums but declared the remedy that the
plaintiffs sought to be too attenuated.48 The court refused to recognize the
proposed class’s requested relief, specifically holding that “the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would find the relief requested
by plaintiffs not legally cognizable under the circumstances present in the
case at bar.”49 Accordingly, the court dismissed the class petition,50 again
42. Id. at 1202–03. The Burford abstention doctrine is a product of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
43. Sierra Club, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 1204–05 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996)).
44. Id. at 1209.
45. 324 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2018).
46. Id. at 1210.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1213.
49. Id. at 1215.
50. Id. at 1220.
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signaling another failure for earthquake mass actions at the federal level. The
plaintiffs’ bar has seemingly since recognized the need to adapt.
Signs of success for class action earthquake litigation, where they exist,
appear at the state court level. The most successful mass action in Oklahoma
is the Lincoln County class action, Cooper v. New Dominion, LLC, which
survived the pleading stage. 51 Cooper asserted a class of Oklahoma-citizen
property owners who lived in one of nine named counties and suffered
property damage resulting from earthquakes in November of 2011.52 The
specificity of this class definition seems to have benefitted the claimants, as
the district court certified them for class treatment in July of 2018.53 The
court specifically ruled that because “the common and core liability issue is
whether Defendant’s wastewater operations caused the earthquakes in
question,” common issues predominated the class members’ claims and
certification was appropriate.54 Though the defendants immediately appealed
the court’s decision to certify the class, the case subsequently settled without
any higher-court adjudication.55
While this settlement provides no clarity for whether this class claim could
survive procedural scrutiny or prove persuasive to a trier of fact, it still
signals unprecedented progress for complex earthquake-based litigation in
the state. Even if the claims in Cooper were not settled, however, the
plaintiffs would have still been confronted with the difficult task of proving
that a specific earthquake induced by a specific injection well caused damage
to a specific property.56 Instructively for future plaintiffs, including those

51. No. CJ-2015-24 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Lincoln Cty. Jan. 18, 2019).
52. Journal Entry Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to 12
O.S. § 2023 at 2, Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (filed July 18, 2018) (on file with the Oklahoma
Law Review).
53. Id. Though the case is a Lincoln County proceeding and filed as such, it was
reassigned to Judge Lori Walkley in the District Court of Cleveland County.
54. Summary Order at 3, Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (filed May 22, 2018) (on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review).
55. In January of 2019, the Cleveland County court approved an agreed class settlement
and dismissed the case with prejudice. Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice as to Plaintiff, the Settlement Class, and Spess, Equal Energy, and Fairfield,
Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (Jan. 18, 2019).
56. There does exist a split between state courts as to whether hydraulic fracturing and
wastewater injection constitutes an “abnormally dangerous” or “ultra-hazardous” activity for
which a strict liability theory would apply. California, Indiana, and Utah have imposed some
form of strict liability for oil and gas operations, while states such as Kansas and Mississippi
have declined to do the same; Oklahoma does not seem to have a case directly addressing
the issue. Blake A. Watson, Fracking and Cracking: Strict Liability for Earthquake Damage
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pursuing the theories proposed in this Comment, Cooper may also indicate
that such cases are more likely to find success at the state court rather than
federal level.57
B. But Where Are the Insurers? Low Payouts and High Premiums from
Insurers of Earthquake Risk
As earthquakes have become more frequent throughout the state, more
Oklahomans are turning to their insurers for protection. But these
policyholders are receiving little in return for their premium dollars. While
specific numbers for each insurance company are not publicly available,58 the
premiums written by the insurance industry as a whole for earthquake
coverage in Oklahoma have increased by millions in recent years.59 The
approval of higher rates is likely the underlying driver of these inflated
premiums.60 As more property owners seek coverage, insurers have
unilaterally appealed to the Oklahoma Insurance Department, seeking
approval for higher and higher rates, culminating in rate increases of more
than 300% since 2011.61 Insurers have justified the need for these higher rates
by citing the rising frequency of earthquakes in the state, which generates
more insurance claims from policyholders.62 And yet, while the frequency of

Due to Wastewater Injection and Hydraulic Fracturing, 11 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 1,
6–9 (2016).
57. Admittedly, class actions are often difficult to keep in state courts due to removal
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018). However,
smaller mass actions (with fewer than 100 plaintiffs) and CAFA’s in-state controversy
exception allow state courts to maintain/retain jurisdiction. See Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue
Cross of Cal., 798 F.3d 923, 928–30 (9th Cir. 2015); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d
945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).
58. The Oklahoma Insurance Department does provide that premiums on earthquake
policies and policy endorsements can add $50 to $300 per year in premiums. Mulready Says
Get Ready: Earthquakes, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/consumers/ insurancebasics/disasters/earthquakes (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
59. See generally Lacie Lowry, Increase in Oklahomans Buying Earthquake Insurance,
NEWS 9 (Jan. 7, 2015, 6:15 PM CST), https://www.news9.com/story/27786943/increase-inoklahomans-buying-earthquake-insurance.
60. A “rate,” in insurance terms, is understood as the “value of insured losses expressed
as a cost per unit of insurance.” Glossary of Insurance Terms, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS,
https://www.naic.org/consumer_glossary.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
61. Heide Brandes, Oklahoma Regulators Raise Concerns on Quake Insurance Rate
Hikes, REUTERS (May 24, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/
idAFL2N18L15K.
62. See id.
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quakes has generally increased,63 very few policyholders have been able to
collect on their earthquake claims.
The Oklahoma Insurance Department (OID) has noted the incongruity of
insurance rates to claim payouts, but has not provided resolution to or
explanation for the problem. In June of 2016, the department’s
Commissioner, John Doak, declared the earthquake insurance market a
“noncompetitive line of insurance,” citing a series of irregularities in the
industry.64 After granting years of rate increases, the OID eventually decided
that “insurers making such filings have not substantiated their need for
increased rates based on objective criteria” or actuarial experience. 65
Moreover, while 119 insurance companies offer earthquake insurance to
Oklahomans, four insurers have constantly held over 50% of the state’s
market share.66 Indeed, any market with few competitors each selling an
increasingly more expensive product is far from competitive. 67 Even since the
Commissioner issued this directive, major insurers have withdrawn from the
Oklahoma earthquake insurance market altogether. Farmers Insurance
Company, for example, informed the OID in late 2016 that it was
withdrawing earthquake coverage from the state because “our earthquake
exposure and pricing in Oklahoma are not sustainable.”68 It seems then that
insurers may have struggled to comport with the OID’s requirements, at least
with respect to rate filings.
More telling for policyholders, however, the OID found that insurers are
making lucrative profits by selling earthquake coverage in the state, as
“evidenced by an average loss ratio over the six years preceding December
31, 2015 of approximately 3%.”69 The department deemed this ratio to be
“unreasonable.”70 An insurer’s “loss ratio” refers to the number of losses

63. See supra note 7.
64. Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, No. 16-0391-TRN, at 3 (Okla. Ins.
Comm’r June 6, 2016), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/060716_160391-TRN-GCA-Order-In-Re-Earthquake-Insurance-Rates.pdf.
65. Id. at 2. The order does not list the identities of these carriers.
66. Id. at 2–3.
67. See id. at 3 (“The concentration of the market and the reticence of consumers to lose
‘package discounts’ constitutes an economic barrier that could prevent new firms from
entering the market.”).
68. Farmers – OK EQ FAQ Final, SERFF Filing Access, NAIC (Submission Date:
10/28/16) (SERFF Tracking Number: FARM-130786205), https://filingaccess.serff.com/
sfa/home/OK.
69. See Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, supra note 64, at 3.
70. Id.
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divided by premium dollars collected.71 By way of comparison, the average
loss ratio for all insurers across all lines of insurance coverage in the same
year was 69.3%.72 This “unreasonably” low ratio, married with continuous
rate increases has defined the current state of earthquake insurance in
Oklahoma: high premium rates for policyholders, low payouts from insurers.
While a low loss ratio necessarily implies few claim payouts, the existing
data on earthquake claim payments in Oklahoma further confirms this
implication.73 In another 2015 bulletin to insurers, the OID specifically noted
“the extraordinary denial rate of earthquake claims that the preliminary data
seems to indicate.”74 Although the bulletin did not disclose the specifics of
this “preliminary data,” further analysis submitted to the U.S. Department of
Insurance indicates that the OID was referring to the fact that insurers had
only paid out on 8% of earthquake claims at that time.75 The years following
continued the trend noted in the report. Despite the generally ongoing rise in
earthquakes across the state, insurers appear to have paid approximately 16%
of all earthquake insurance claims filed in the state since the beginning of the
earthquake outbreak in 2010.76 Few claims payouts do not automatically
indicate bad faith or malicious practices on the part of insurers, and the
71. For example, a high-loss ratio would approach or exceed 100%, effectively meaning
that the insurer is either losing money or making as much in premiums as it is paying out in
indemnity. A ratio of more than 100% would equate to a net loss. See Glossary of Insurance
Terms, supra note 60 (defining loss ratio as “the percentage of incurred losses to earned
premiums”).
72. Brian Briggs & Bree Wilson, U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Industry—2017
First Half Results, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/documents/
topic_insurance_industry_snapshots_2017_industry_analysis_reports.pdf (last visited Jan.
18, 2020). 2016 was not an anomalous year, as the average loss ratios in 2016 and 2017 were
71.4% and 73%, respectively. Id.
73. See JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC
2015-02: EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE, EXCLUDED LOSS, INSPECTION OF INSURED PROPERTY AND
ADJUSTER TRAINING (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/10/030415_Earthquake-Bulletin-3-3-15.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02].
74. Id. at 2.
75. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON PROTECTION OF
INSURANCE CONSUMERS AND ACCESS TO INSURANCE 12 (Nov. 2016), https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/2016_FIO_Consumer_Report.
pdf.
76. Corey Jones & Curtis Killman, Earthquake Insurance: 3 in 20 Claims Approved in
Oklahoma Since 2010, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.tulsaworld.com/
earthquakes/earthquake-insurance-in-claims-approved-in-oklahoma-since/article_de5887251475-592c-9025-bdcfbf9b8bcd.html. This number comes from data provided directly from
the OID to the local press on 1800 filed earthquake damage claims, with only 292 of them
receiving payment. Id.
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Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner made as much clear in the local press. 77
Still, these low payout numbers are certainly consistent with and explanatory
of the “unreasonably” low loss ratios the OID described.
Despite the broad recalcitrance towards indemnifying insurance claims,
insurers maintain a unique position through which they could lead the charge
to hold the oil and gas industry accountable for damage caused by induced
earthquakes in Oklahoma. Because of the long-recognized doctrine of
subrogation, insurers maintain the ability to recoup the amount paid to
insureds by seeking compensation from third parties responsible for the
damage.78 Oklahoma courts have succinctly characterized subrogation as “the
equitable right of an insurer to be put in the position of its insured so that it
may pursue recovery from any third parties who are legally responsible to the
insured for a loss paid by the insurer.”79 Logically, given the aforementioned
scientific link between wastewater injection wells and earthquakes,80 insurers
could apply the doctrine of subrogation against oil and gas companies
responsible for damages to their insureds’ property. Just as individuals have
recognized and pursued their right to seek compensation from the source of
the state’s quakes, so too could insurers. In this vein, the Oklahoma
Legislature has proposed a bill explicitly outlining the ability of insurers to
seek subrogation for human-made earthquakes.81 The state’s Insurance
Commissioner has recognized the already-existing ability of insurers to seek
subrogation for such claims, however, and deemed the bill unnecessary
because “[i]nsurers already have the right of subrogation in the state.”82
77. See Maureen Wurtz, Earthquake Damage Claims Rarely Paid by Insurance
Companies, KTUL (Feb. 20, 2017), https://ktul.com/news/local/months-after-recordoklahoma-quake-insurance-companies-slow-to-pay-for-damage. Commissioner John Doak,
in this local news interview, explained, “Maybe as we’re looking at those denials, that may
not mean that there’s not damage, it just may mean that it’s not reached the level of the
insurance company to make a payment.” Id. (quoting John Doak, Oklahoma Insurance
Commissioner at the time of the interview).
78. See generally Hanover Ins. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308–09
(N.D. Okla. 2002).
79. Id. (citing 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 222:5 (rev. 3d ed. 2000)).
80. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
81. Brianna Bailey, Oklahoma Legislature Considers Two Bills on Earthquake
Insurance Reforms, OKLAHOMAN (Feb. 25, 2016, 10:47 PM), https://oklahoman.com/
article/5481266/oklahoma-legislature-considers-two-bills-on-earthquake-insurance-reforms.
82. Id. Perhaps due to the Commissioner’s comments, the bill never gained much
legislative traction. Senate Bill 1498 has yet to reach the state senate floor for any votes and
appears to be effectively dead at the time of this writing. Bill Information for SB 1498,
OKLA. STATE LEGIS., http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=sb1498&Session
=1600 (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
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This right, however, is not without its limits and can be waived when
insurers deny their policyholders’ claims. Oklahoma courts have specifically
recognized that an insurer is estopped from raising a claim of subrogation
after a policyholder has refused the insurer’s suggested settlement amount
and the insurer has denied the claim.83 Given the high denial rate for
earthquake claims, it is unsurprising that major insurers in the state have not
pursued their subrogation right against oil and gas producers for earthquake
damages.84 With such a low loss ratio and abnormally high profit margins,
insurance companies may be reluctant to engage in what would surely be
complex and expensive litigation, which has already produced uneven results
for individual plaintiffs. Given that insurers are disinterested in pursuing a
subrogation claim and pay such a low rate of filed claims, those individuals
with earthquake insurance in Oklahoma may understandably feel that they
are paying for functionally non-existent coverage.85 The relatively untested
doctrines of reasonable expectations and illusory coverage, however, may
provide these policyholders with a remedy.
C. The Doctrines of Reasonable Expectations and Illusory Coverage May
Allow Earthquake Policyholders to Give Meaning to Their Policies
In some circumstances, courts may intervene to enforce the terms and
spirit of insurance policies. Unlike the oil and gas industry,86 which has little
direct contact with and owes few duties to the average Oklahoman whom
earthquakes have harmed, insurers owe each of their policyholders an
implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing.87 This duty transcends the
written policy contract and “extends to all types of insurance companies and

83. Sexton v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 1991 OK 84, ¶ 21, 816 P.2d 1135, 1139.
84. Steadfast Insurance has filed a subrogation action against several oil and gas
producers in the Northern District of Oklahoma for almost $400,000 in indemnity payouts,
though no progression in this litigation seems apparent beyond the filing. Sarah Terry-Cobo,
Steadfast Insurance Sues Oil and Gas Companies Over Earthquake Damage, J. REC. (Nov.
28,
2018),
https://journalrecord.com/2018/11/28/steadfast-insurance-sues-oil-and-gascompanies-over-earthquake-damage/.
85. A news article from Glencoe, Oklahoma, while anecdotal, expressed this exact
frustration. Upon denial of his earthquake claim, a local man complained that “[y]ou’re
better off taking your money and going to the casino. I’m serious. You got a better chance of
winning.” Sarah Stewart, Oklahoma Man Warning Others: Don’t Get Earthquake
Insurance, OKLA.’S NEWS 4 (May 26, 2016, 6:49 PM CDT), https://kfor.com/2016/05/26/
oklahoma-man-warning-others-dont-get-earthquake-insurance/.
86. Of course, oil and gas companies owe basic duties to property owners as would any
industry or individual. See generally Cypser & Davis, supra note 8, at 566–85.
87. Sizemore v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 2006 OK 36, ¶ 15, 142 P.3d 47, 51.
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insurance policies.”88 The duty of good faith and fair dealing allows potential
plaintiffs whose property is damaged from an earthquake to consider an
action against their insurance carrier if their claims are denied before
pursuing relief from the oil and gas industry.89 Although policyholders can
seek recourse, including class actions and multi-plaintiff actions, for a
violation of this duty, the fact-specific details required for a bad faith action
fall beyond the scope of this Comment.90 All the same, the high denial rates
of earthquake insurance claims in the state, partnered with the explanations of
those denials, may encourage an action against insurers focused more
specifically in the contracts doctrine of reasonable expectations and its
progeny of illusory insurance coverage.91
The language and enforcement of insurance contracts in Oklahoma are
bound to certain principles of fairness to the policyholder under the doctrine
of reasonable expectations.92 When courts choose to implement this doctrine,
ambiguous or broad exclusions contained in insurance contracts cannot “be
permitted to serve as traps for policy holders” and must be interpreted in a
way favorable to facilitating the payment of claims. 93 Generally, the doctrine
of reasonable expectations as applied to insurance contracts ensures that
policyholders receive the coverage they expect, despite complicated or
otherwise unclear provisions that would deny the coverage in an unexpected

88. Id. (quoting Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 1992 OK 34, ¶ 6, 828 P.2d 431,
432–33). The duty of insurers to deal with policyholders fairly and in good faith exists
largely through the common law but is more defined and codified through Oklahoma’s
version of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 36 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1250.1–1250.17
(Supp. 2018).
89. A claim denial, in itself, does not constitute bad faith claims handling or illusory
coverage. See Luc Cohen, Insurers Shun Risk as Oil-Linked Quakes Soar in Oklahoma,
REUTERS (May 12, 2016, 12:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oklahomaearthquakes/insurers-shun-risk-as-oil-linked-quakes-soar-in-oklahoma-idUSKCN0Y30DC.
For their part, insurers will claim that they often rely on outside experts and engineers to
justify any denials that fall above policy deductibles. Id.
90. An insurance bad faith inquiry looks to whether an insurer deals fairly with its
insured and pays the claim at issue promptly. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977
OK 141, ¶ 32, 577 P.2d 899, 905.
91. Contractual claims are often pleaded in tandem with insurance bad faith claims,
even in past Oklahoma class actions. See, e.g., Burgess v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2006 OK 66, ¶
1, 151 P.3d 92, 93.
92. Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 1996 OK 28, ¶¶ 6–10, 912 P.2d
861, 863–64.
93. Id. ¶ 24, 912 P.2d at 870.
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way.94 This is not to say that the clear language of insurance policies is not
enforceable or cannot prevail, but there are instances where the existence of
ambiguities in an insurance contract necessitate further protections for
policyholders.95
Despite Oklahoma’s adoption of reasonable expectations as applied to
insurance contracts and provisions, the state has yet to explicitly endorse a
doctrine that has derived from this principle in other jurisdictions: the
doctrine of illusory insurance coverage.96 Though a suit directly pleading the
existence of illusory coverage would likely create a case of first impression
for Oklahoma courts and only apply in limited scenarios, the unique issues
and astronomical denial rates of the state’s earthquake insurance claims may
create an ideal case in which the courts could first apply the doctrine.97
The illusory coverage doctrine may allow Oklahoman earthquake
insurance policyholders to finally receive the coverage they expected when
they purchased their policies. There is little jurisdictional consensus as to an
exact enumeration of this doctrine, but most agree that it allows a
policyholder to challenge a policy or endorsement that is functionally
worthless as written or as enforced.98 Courts often find coverage to be
illusory when some exclusion or addendum within the policy renders it
generally ineffective for the policyholder.99 Accordingly, because exclusions
that are either ambiguously vague (and thus over-inclusive in application), or
specific but impracticably applied, may fit the definition of illusory, courts
can compel insurers to pay out under policies that they had previously

94. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967–68 (1970).
95. Max True, ¶ 8, 912 P.2d at 865 (“The doctrine does not negate the importance of
policy language.”).
96. The illusory coverage doctrine serves a similar purpose as the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, namely “to qualify the general rule that courts will enforce an insurance
contract as written.” Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
97. Oklahoma courts have not yet explicitly endorsed the illusory coverage doctrine.
However, the Oklahoma Insurance Department has referenced the doctrine with regards to
insurers’ vague sale of “additional coverage” for wind and hail policies. See JOHN D. DOAK,
OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2016-02: LAWS AND
ORDINANCES, ADDITIONAL COVERAGE; FORTIFIED HOME™—HIGH WIND AND HAIL PROGRAM
2 (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/042516_FinalBulletin2.pdf.
98. Ian Weiss, Comment, The Illusory Coverage Doctrine: A Critical Review, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2018).
99. See id. at 1548–50.
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denied.100 Illusory coverage as a doctrine has largely developed on a state-bystate basis, with several courts justifying the existence of the doctrine as
serving an important policy interest in protecting the expectations of
insureds.101 With the regulatory insurance body in Oklahoma declaring the
earthquake insurance market “uncompetitive” and denial rates
“unreasonable,” the state is certainly at a crisis point for the expectations of
its insureds and should implement this doctrine.
Earthquake insurance policies in Oklahoma may be especially susceptible
to the illusory coverage doctrine because of two common exclusions found in
the policies: an exclusion for human-made quakes and an exclusion for preexisting “earth settlement.” The illusory coverage doctrine most regularly
applies to specific policy endorsements like earthquake coverage, rather than
an insurance policy in its entirety.102 More specifically, courts might trigger
the doctrine when a particular policy exclusion “reduces the possibility that a
given piece of coverage will actually come in handy to the policyholder.”103
This doctrine does not mandate that the exclusion must necessarily render
collection under the policy impossible to be found “illusory.”104 The OID has
recognized two such exclusions for earthquake policies, without explicitly
defining them as illusory exclusions.
In October 2015, the OID advised insurers to specifically note if their
policies excluded human-made earthquakes, because current policy language

100. See id. at 1550.
101. Id. at 1552. Weiss argues that any supposed “public policy” underlying the doctrine
ultimately derives from more codified sources of law. Id. He still recognizes, as have several
courts, that many believe public policy to be the ultimate foundation of the doctrine. Id. at
1552–54; see, e.g., Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[E]xclusions that render coverage illusory . . . might violate public policy.”); Point
of Rocks Ranch, L.L.C. v. Sun Valley Title Ins. Co., 146 P.3d 677, 680 (Idaho 2006)
(“When a policy only provides an illusion of coverage . . . [it] will be considered void as
violating public policy.”) (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dixon, 112 P.3d
825 (Idaho 2005)). But see State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1142
(Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“[W]e have been hesitant to invoke public policy to limit or avoid
express contract terms . . . .”).
102. See Weiss, supra note 98, at 1556 (explaining that the issue “is whether a particular
coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion”) (quoting Great N. Ins. Co. v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008)); see
also Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he
doctrine of illusory coverage is best applied . . . where part of the premium is specifically
allocated to a particular type . . . of coverage . . . .”) (emphasis added).
103. Weiss, supra note 98, at 1559.
104. Id. at 1561.
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“may be ambiguous as to the coverage afforded.”105 This ambiguity is exactly
why the doctrine of illusory coverage exists. The OID warned of the danger
of such uncertainty in a similar bulletin, published just months prior,
expressing a “concern[] that insurers could be denying claims based on the
unsupported belief that these earthquakes were the result of fracking or
injection well activity.”106 An Oklahoman insurance policy that either
expressly writes out or ambiguously excludes induced earthquakes, combined
with consistent denials of coverage due to the human-made nature of the
quakes from insurers, is a perfect recipe for policyholders to seek redress
under the doctrine of illusory coverage. Given that Oklahomans appear to be
purchasing earthquake coverage to protect themselves from these quakes 107
and because the scientific consensus that the rise in the state’s earthquakes is
tied to human-made causes,108 it seems facially apparent that an insurance
policy that excludes induced quakes fails to provide the coverage that a
policyholder reasonably expects.109
Even policyholders whose insurance does cover induced earthquakes may
still reasonably feel as though their coverage is merely illusory.110 When the
OID warned insurers with human-made exclusions, it also skeptically noted
that many insurers are denying claims by asserting “pre-existing damage.”111
While in that bulletin the OID did not note the exact kind of pre-existing
105. Scott Kersgaard, Oklahoma’s Doak Tells Insurers to Clarify Earthquake Coverage,
INS. BUS. AM. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breakingnews/oklahomas-doak-tells-insurers-to-clarify-earthquake-coverage-25980.aspx
(quoting
JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-04
(Oct. 9, 2015)).
106. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. The Pennsylvania Insurance
Department issued a similar notice to carriers in its state. Penn.: Fracking Exclusion Not
Allowed in Homeowners Earthquake Endorsements, INS. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/east/2015/04/15/364460.htm.
107. See Thrasher, supra note 1.
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
109. The lack of coverage that policyholders reasonably expected is a consistent tenet of
illusory coverage findings. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 774 F.3d 702, 709
(11th Cir. 2014).
110. The OID issued a follow up to its original 2015-02 bulletin wherein it noted “the
insurance industry has begun offering enhanced earthquake coverage that treats earthquakes
caused by water disposal injection wells or hydraulic fracturing as covered events”
indicating that fewer insurers now exclude induced quakes. JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS.
COMM’R, REVISED EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02: EARTHQUAKE
INSURANCE, WATER DISPOSAL WELLS AND FRACKING (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.oid.
ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/081015_EarthquakeBulletin.pdf [hereinafter REVISED
BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02].
111. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2.
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damage that insurers are citing, it has expressed elsewhere that “some of the
most common exclusions for earthquake insurance are masonry (brick)
veneer, vehicles and pre-existing damage.”112 To be clear, the mere existence
of a pre-existing earth settlement exception in an earthquake policy is not
prima facie illusory coverage,113 even if the two seismic events seem
similar.114
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has specifically noted that the words “earth
movement” in an insurance policy are not inherently ambiguous.115 If,
however, insurers are relying on this exception to overwhelmingly deny
claims and are doing so without “inspect[ing] the property prior to inception
of the coverage and maintain[ing] reasonably current information as to the
condition of the insured property[] prior to loss,” as the OID has suggested, 116
then the coverage may be illusory all the same. Leaning on this particular
exclusion, insurers may still not face a realistic risk of payment. A preexisting damage rationale for a claim denial, without a pre-loss understanding
of the property at issue, surely seems to strain logic. An unsupported use of
this exclusion to deny coverage that policyholders reasonably expect would
create a strong inference for illusory coverage. The data on how regularly
insurers deny earthquake claims in the state citing pre-existing settlement is
not publicly available, though courts could likely compel insurers to produce
such figures in litigation.117
Were a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs to find that insurers frequently rely on
this exclusion and do so without corroborating information regarding the
damaged property, they may well be able to show that the insurers are
“receiv[ing] premiums when realistically [they are] not incurring any risk of

112. Mulready Says Get Ready: Earthquakes, supra note 58.
113. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019). All
exclusions necessarily limit coverage and are not automatically illusory-rendering.
114. Some instances of ground settlement, including liquefaction and seismicallyinduced landslides, may even directly result from earthquakes. See Ground Failure Scientific
Background, USGS, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/data/ground-failure/background.php (last
visited Jan. 22, 2020).
115. Davis-Travis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 336 F. App’x 770, 774 (10th Cir.
2009).
116. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2.
117. See Milinazzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 691, 696 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding
that “documents related to the ‘investigation, processing, analysis’ and ultimate denial of
Plaintiff’s claim are relevant” in a breach of contract case); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. §
3226(A)(1) (Supp. 2018) (outlining that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”).
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liability.”118 If plaintiffs could similarly tie this reliance upon an unjustified
and broad exception, it would further the likelihood that a court may compel
payment from an insurer, despite an insurance company’s arguments that
coverage may still be possible, even with the exclusion.119 Although an action
for illusory coverage citing this exclusion could find success, it would likely
be more difficult for plaintiffs than a similar action involving an outright
exclusion of induced earthquakes, because of the factual fight likely to
follow.
Given the apparent similarity of earthquake claim denials among
policyholders across the state and the recent spark of success in state-level
mass litigation concerning earthquakes more generally,120 plaintiffs should
consider banding together and bringing their illusory coverage claims as part
of a class action. A class of purely Oklahoma-based citizens, with a
concentrated focus on the issue of illusory coverage, may be attractive to
Oklahoma policyholders and perhaps successful in state-level courts. Due to
the likely number of policyholders affected by claim denials under what may
be an illusory policy, a class action would likely promote economy,
efficiency, and consistency in the adjudication of this state-wide issue.121
Though such a class would likely have to overcome issues of predominance
and individuality of claims and damages, Oklahoma may serve as a valuable
venue all the same.122 Indeed, as research into the relatively certificationfriendly nature of Oklahoma class action law has suggested, “the cumulative
effect of Oklahoma case law . . . may well be to make Oklahoma a more
desirable forum for national state law class action litigation.”123 Accordingly,
the facts of widespread earthquake claim denials and the landscape of the
118. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839,
843 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting O’Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo.
1985) (en banc)).
119. Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho
2000) (finding illusory coverage when a part of a policy “affords no realistic protection to
any group or class of injured persons,” despite “some small circumstance[s] where coverage
could arguably exist”).
120. Referencing the aforementioned state-level class certification of earthquake victims
in Cooper v. New Dominion, LLC, No. CJ-2015-000024 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Lincoln Cty. Jan.
18, 2019).
121. See Steven S. Gensler, Civil Procedure: Class Certification and the Predominance
Requirement Under Oklahoma Section 2023(B)(3), 56 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2003)
(highlighting these factors in class certification).
122. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (Supp. 2018) (requiring in pertinent part that
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members”).
123. Gensler, supra note 121, at 326.
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state’s class action jurisprudence may fuse to create a favorable venue for
multi-plaintiff earthquake actions.
II. The Regulatory Enforcement Power of the Oklahoma Insurance
Department and Its Potential to Better Serve Earthquake Policyholders
What appears lacking from Oklahoma Insurance Department publicly
issued bulletins and instructions is any pattern of enforcement from the
state’s Insurance Commissioner.124 Indeed, the OID’s bulletins indicate that
the state’s insurance regulatory body has identified many concerns facing
earthquake policyholders.125 By enforcing these existing memoranda, the
OID could significantly alleviate the issues plaguing Oklahoma earthquake
policyholders.
The Oklahoma Insurance Code grants the state’s Insurance Commissioner
and Insurance Department wide latitude to regulate—and if necessary,
reprimand—insurers who choose to sell policies within the state. 126
Moreover, the OID and its Commissioner serve as a general gatekeeper to
insurers who wish to practice in Oklahoma, as all insurers may only transact
insurance in the state with the approval and license of the Department.127 To
maintain its license and good standing in the state, an insurer must comply
with all provisions of the Insurance Code and with the “charter powers” that
the Code grants to the department and its Commissioner.128
Chief among these “charter powers” is the Insurance Commissioner’s
authority to regulate insurers consistent with Oklahoma’s adoption of the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.129 This Act prohibits insurance
124. Since the OID first issued bulletins pertaining to concerns in earthquake insurance,
it has not issued a single public reprimand, bulletin, or Final Order punishing an insurer for
violating the same. See Final Orders 2016, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/aboutoid/divisions-programs/legal-division/final-orders/final-orders-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2020); Final Orders 2015, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/about-oid/divisionsprograms/legal-division/final-orders/final-orders-2015/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020); Bulletins,
OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/about-oid/divisions-programs/legal-division/
bulletins/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
125. See supra notes 73, 106 and accompanying text.
126. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018) (“The Commissioner may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations for the implementation and administration of the provisions of the
Insurance Code.”).
127. Id. § 607(A).
128. Id.; see also id. § 618 (granting the Insurance Commissioner the ability to refuse to
renew or revoke an insurer’s license to operate if the insurer is (1) in violation of the Code,
or (2) “no longer meets the requirements for the authority originally granted”).
129. Id. § 1250.13.
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companies from conducting a wide range of dishonest dealings, pertinently
including failing to comply with issued orders of the Commissioner. 130
Penalties for violations of the Insurance Code and subsequent orders range
from revocation of the insurer’s license to other appropriate methods which
would “limit, regulate, and control the insurer’s line of business.”131
Compounded, these provisions of the Oklahoma Insurance Code allow the
state’s Insurance Commissioner to set rules of practice for insurers and
penalize insurers who fail to abide by those regulations.
A. Recognized Issues Without Prescribed Solutions in the Oklahoma
Insurance Department’s Earthquake Insurance Findings
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner John Doak’s first notable bulletin
regarding earthquake insurance, Earthquake Insurance Bulletin No. PC 201502, presented several actionable criteria for the department to enforce against
insurers in the state. As previously mentioned, the Commissioner expressed
concern that insurers, hesitant to enter into the debate over the causation of
induced earthquakes, could be refusing to fulfill claims “on the unsupported
belief” these quakes were human-made. 132 Appearing to support
enforcement, the Commissioner has advised that “[i]f that were the case,
companies could expect the Department to take appropriate action to enforce
the law.”133 This bulletin implies that the OID would take action to reprimand
insurers who deny claims with an unsubstantiated claim that the earthquake
was human-made, but public follow-up to this bulletin is nonexistent. 134
Moreover, the Commissioner signaled his intent to further investigate these
unpaid claims through a market conduct exam, though the Commissioner has
not conducted nor published the results of such an examination.135
In the same bulletin, the Commissioner expressed his concerns regarding
pre-existing damage claims and exclusions concerning earthquake damage. 136
130. Id.
131. Id. § 1250.13(A).
132. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2 (emphasis removed).
133. Id.
134. The Oklahoma Insurance Department website lists no public filings showing a
follow-up that addresses these issues. See supra note 124.
135. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3. The Commissioner has statutory
authority to conduct such an evaluation. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 311.4(F) (Supp. 2018) (“The
Insurance Commissioner may use market conduct annual statements or amendments or
addendums . . . in determining compliance with the laws of this state and rules adopted by
the Insurance Commissioner.”). This lack of evaluation may be because of OID’s revision of
Bulletin PC 2015-02. See REVISED BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 110.
136. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

984

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:963

Again, while litigation allows policyholders to challenge these disputes
instantly, proactive measures from the OID may preempt the need for such
litigation altogether. Through the bulletin, the Commissioner expressed
concerns that while insurers have the right to exclude certain damage in
earthquake claims attributed to pre-existing damage, insurers must actually
inspect the property to engage these exceptions.137 Specifically, the
Commissioner questioned if “insurers are employing fair claims practices” in
these denials,138 presumably implicating the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act. As a solution to this worry, the Commissioner clarified his
expectation that “[i]f an insurer intends to deny a claim, asserting [‘]preexisting’ damage, I expect that the insurer has inspected the property prior to
inception of the coverage and maintained reasonably current information as
to the condition of the insured property, prior to loss.”139 As already noted,
this lack of justification for denied claims leaves insureds susceptible to
functionally non-existent coverage.140 This susceptibility is especially
unacceptable given that the Commissioner hinted here towards a follow-up
market conduct exam that seems to have never taken place. 141
Lastly, in the 2015-02 bulletin, the Commissioner expressed his
expectation for the training of insurance adjustors who handle earthquake
damage claims.142 Citing his belief that earthquake “coverage may not be
well understood” and noting the “[c]omplex fact questions [which] arise
when determining whether earth movement has resulted from a covered
cause or an excluded cause[,]” the Commissioner recommended heightened
training requirements for adjustors in this field. 143 Specifically, the
Commissioner asked that earthquake damage adjustors receive training on
masonry veneer, high deductible costs, and structural damage.144 By terming
all of these undoubtedly helpful policies as “expectations” and by failing to
issue corresponding orders, however, the Commissioner has still not gone far
enough to protect the policyholders he is obligated to safeguard.145
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
141. See BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The Oklahoma Insurance Department has issued bulletins for a variety of issues,
oftentimes clearing up legal uncertainties, see OKLA. INS. DEP’T, BULLETIN NO. PC 2010-05
AND LH 2010-04: ARBITRATION CLAUSES (Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/PC-2010-05-and-LH-2010-04.pdf (discussing arbitration clauses),

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7

2020]

COMMENTS

985

Unenforced half-measures fall short of the immediate security that injured
policyholders deserve.
B. The Transition to Enforceability: The Oklahoma Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act as an Avenue of Redress
The Commissioner has already demonstrated exactly how these bulletins
can unambiguously transform into enforceable orders from the OID. In the
aforementioned “Order In Re: Earthquake Insurance Rates,” the
Commissioner made clear that he was acting under “the duty of
administering and enforcing all provisions of the Oklahoma Insurance
Code.”146 Moreover, the OID served its order on “[a]ll licensed property and
casualty insurers issuing earthquake insurance in the State of Oklahoma.”147
That same language is absent from bulletins 2015-02 and 04, and while that
absence does not inherently prove a lack of enforceability, it does leave room
for the Commissioner to clarify its expectations for the industry. 148
Oklahoma’s Insurance Code provides the Commissioner and OID with more
than sufficient authority to see that insurers adhere to the bulletins, just like
the earthquake rate order.149
Because of the importance of the guidance outlined to insurers in the
Commissioner’s bulletins, the OID or the Commissioner himself could reissue these same bulletins as orders with explicit reference to Oklahoma’s
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.150 Specifically, each of the
Commissioner’s “expectations” as outlined in the bulletins seem to go to
specific concerns or provisions of UCSPA.151 First, the Commissioner
expressed concern that insurers were denying coverage on the
unsubstantiated basis that policyholders’ damage resulted from injection well
or setting expectations from the OID, see JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, BULLETIN NO.
PC 2013-07: PUBLIC ADJUSTERS AND FEES (June 14, 2013), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/061713_public-adjuster-bulletin.pdf (discussing public adjusters
and fees).
146. Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, supra note 64, at 1. Moreover, the notice
was quite literally labeled as an “Order.” Id.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Oklahoma law does allow for a state agency to interpret the regulations, and
occasionally statutes, pertaining to that agency’s scope through bulletins and other issued
interpretations. See Cox Okla. Telecom, LLC v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2007 OK
55, ¶¶ 23–27, 164 P.3d 150, 160.
149. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018); see also infra Section II.A.
150. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13. The Insurance Code grants the Insurance Commissioner
with the ability to enforce all orders issued consistent with the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act. Id.
151. See BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73.
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activity;152 the UCSPA punishes insurers who “[k]nowingly misrepresent[] to
claimants pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at
issue.”153 Second, the Commissioner worried that insurers were claiming preexisting damage without adequately maintaining pre-loss information on
property;154 the UCSPA prohibits insurers from “[f]ailing to adopt and
implement reasonable standards for prompt investigations of claims arising
under its insurance policies or insurance contracts.”155 Finally, the
Commissioner feared that insurers had not properly trained adjustors on the
specifics of earthquake damage; 156 again, the UCSPA demands that insurers
maintain reasonable investigative standards.157 The Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act then, provides Oklahoma’s Insurance Commissioner with both
the legal authority to issue orders and several rationales upon which to base
those orders.
As this Comment has already noted, orders which derive from the UCSPA
carry with them significant enforcement power.158 With these bulletins reissued as orders, the OID and its Commissioner would retain the clear
authority to crack down on noncompliant insurers. If insurers refused to
provide a reasonable basis for a denial, maintain pre-loss records of insureds’
property, or train claims adjustors to specifically handle earthquake damage,
the Commissioner would have the ability to take the most severe action
authorized under Oklahoma law: “revoke or suspend the insurer’s certificate
of authority.”159 Orders consistent with the UCSPA also allow the
Commissioner to take intermediate steps “to the extent deemed necessary to
obtain the insurer’s compliance with the order,” presumably including the
imposition of fines or similar financial penalties.160
The Commissioner’s enforcement of orders under the UCSPA not only
serves to create stronger and more apparent guidelines by which insurers
must abide, but such orders and corresponding reprimands would also aid
plaintiffs pursuing individual cases under the USCPA. While the UCSPA
exists to serve the regulatory functions of Oklahoma’s Insurance Department,
violations of the Act are not entirely separated from private causes of action.
152. Id. at 1–2.
153. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(2).
154. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2.
155. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3).
156. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3.
157. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3).
158. See id. § 1250.5.
159. Id. § 1250.13(A); see also id. §§ 606–607 (mandating that all insurance carriers
must maintain a certificate of authority in order to transact business in Oklahoma).
160. Id. § 1250.13(A).
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Though an individual plaintiff cannot bring suit solely for a claimed violation
of the UCSPA, “the UCSPA can provide the district court [or any trial court]
with guidance in determining whether particular conduct on the part of an
insurer is unreasonable and sufficient to constitute a basis for a bad faith
claim.”161 Moreover, the Insurance Commissioner may turn to the state’s
Attorney General for assistance in enforcing the Commissioner’s orders. 162
And if the Attorney General pursues judicial intervention from the state’s
courts, the insurer is liable for attorney fees should the state prevail.163
Unfortunately, however, the OID has a documented history of regularly
issuing bulletins, while seldomly following through with more forceful
orders. As the public record demonstrates, the OID has issued twenty-one
bulletins since 2010 concerning property and casualty insurance issues. 164
Within the same span of time, the Department issued a total of three
orders.165 Not one of the issued orders appears to correspond with the issued
bulletins.166 It seems then that enforcement through the OID has typically
followed the same pattern: the Commissioner issues a bulletin, threatens
enforcement of that bulletin, and enforcement never comes.167 But there is no
reason for this trend to continue. The Commissioner can and should buck this
trend to issue UCSPA follow-up orders to the corresponding earthquake
bulletins.
To most effectively ensure compliance with the issues that the Insurance
Department has noted, the OID would be well-served to convert the
Commissioner’s bulletins into UCSPA orders and enforce them as such.

161. Beers v. Hillory, 2010 OK CIV APP 99, ¶ 30, 241 P.3d 285, 294.
162. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13(A).
163. Id. § 1250.13(B).
164. Bulletins, supra note 124.
165. Commissioner’s Orders, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/regulatedentities/rate-and-form-filing/property-and-casualty-insurance/commissioners-orders/
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2020).
166. Id.
167. Past scholarship on the OID has commented on this same trend. Kelsey D. Dulin,
The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ Post- Catastrophe Claims Handling
Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 195 (2008) (“Under existing laws, Oklahoma appears to be
sufficiently equipped with the tools necessary to bring the insurance industry’s claims
handling behavior into accord with Oklahoma’s Insurance Code—it is the enforcement of
existing laws that is lacking.”).
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III. Moving Forward; Building a Legislative Framework to Better Regulate
the Earthquake Insurance Market
While litigation and tightened regulation would both help to rectify
potential past conduct of earthquake insurers in Oklahoma, the legislature is
in the best position to outline a clear set of policies to avoid recurring issues.
Fortunately for the Oklahoma legislature, it is not the first state to experience
a sudden uptick in seismic activity, followed by a panicked earthquake
insurance market. California experienced a similar crisis following the
catastrophic Northridge earthquake of 1994.168 Although California’s
responses to that disaster were then and are now imperfect,169 Oklahoma
would be well-served to follow its example of insurance lawmaking in the
years after the quake. Specifically, the Oklahoma legislature should strongly
consider establishing an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, modeled after the
California Earthquake Authority. Because the formation of such an agency is
strongly tied to a legal requirement for insurers to offer earthquake insurance
to their policyholders, the Oklahoma legislature should pass a similar
accompanying law. Oklahoma may be able to form its own Authority
separate and apart from the existence of such a legal mandate, but such a
requirement would strengthen and attune the state’s market.
A. An Example Worth Following: The California Earthquake Authority as a
Model for Oklahoma
No stranger to seismic activity, California’s insurance industry forever
changed following one of its most severe earthquakes: the 1994 Northridge
earthquake just outside of Los Angeles. 170 Given its proximity to one of the
world’s most populous cities, the quake caused an estimated $20 billion in
residential damage, less than half of which was ultimately covered by
insurance.171 Unprepared for an event of this size, 93% of California
homeowners’ insurers either restricted or altogether withdrew their
earthquake policies.172 In the aftermath of this insurer exodus, Californians
found it arduous, if not impossible, to locate a carrier who would insure their
168. Leslie Scism, California’s Earthquake Problem: People Aren’t Scared Enough
About Them, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2015, 8:15 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
california-pushes-homeowners-to-insure-against-earthquakes-1440980138.
169. Some have been critical of the CEA’s slow rate in increasing the number of
Californians with sufficient earthquake insurance. See id.
170. History of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH.,
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/About-CEA/CEA-History (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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home against the next potential quake. 173 After two years of proposed
solutions and political back and forth, the California legislature created the
first-of-its-kind California Earthquake Authority (CEA).174
Not itself an insurance company, the CEA exists as a “public
instrumentality of the State of California,” which offers and facilitates the
offering of earthquake insurance to Californian policyholders.175 The CEA
provides earthquake coverage through this two-fold approach: providing
CEA “basic residential earthquake insurance” policies and providing the
ability for CEA-authorized insurers to “sell residential earthquake insurance
products that supplement or augment the basic residential earthquake
insurance provided by the authority.”176 Through this system, the state
provides basic coverage while private insurers’ plans fill any existing gaps
and provide for coverage over and above that baseline. However, and
importantly, the CEA itself does not sell products directly to the public. 177
Instead, CEA participating insurers issue these products pursuant to the CEA
guidelines and expectations, thus avoiding a significant cost burden to the
state.178 CEA policies are available for standard homeowners, as well as
mobile home residents, condominium/apartment owners, and renters.179
The CEA formed primarily through the existence of a unique California
law, under which insurers must offer earthquake homeowners insurance to
their insureds.180 Due to the typically high rate of earthquakes in California,
the state has required insurers, since the 1980s, to offer earthquake coverage
to its policyholders as a condition to selling or renewing any homeowners

173. See id.
174. Daniel Marshall, An Overview of the California Earthquake Authority, 21 RISK
MGMT. & INS. REV. 73, 74–75 (2018) (noting also that the title of the authorizing legislation
was the Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 1996) [hereinafter Marshall, Overview
Article].
175. Id. at 91 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.21).
176. Id. (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.27(b)(1)).
177. Id. (noting that the CEA provides insurance “through its legal agents”).
178. Id. at 91.
CEA receives no financial support through the California state budget—its sole
capital comes from private sources (contributions from participating insurance
companies, accumulations of surplus revenues, accumulated investment
returns), and its sole revenue comes from premiums realized through sale (by
participating insurers) of CEA insurance products and from investment returns.
Id. at 100.
179. Id. at 76.
180. Id. at 81.
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policy.181 California is, at the time of this writing, the only state in the nation
with such a requirement.182 Policyholders are not under a duty to accept this
offer, but the insurer must continue to make it available throughout the
lifespan of the policy.183 As the CEA itself explains, “In California, insuring a
home for earthquake is important enough that the choice to do so belongs—
with certain conditions imposed—to the policyholder, not the insurer.”184
Rates and premium prices for CEA policies are not created or maintained
by the CEA itself, but through the California Department of Insurance. 185 By
putting these rates in the control of this regulatory agency, California avoids
“noncompetitive” market crises, while generally keeping premiums and
policy costs low.186 As evidence of the regulation’s efficacy, the CEA
estimates that without its rate control mechanisms, the average premium on
its policies would more than double.187 CEA policies also offer and prescribe
a range of premiums to better share the risk between insurers and
policyholders, while maintaining a consistent market.188 These rates are based
on actuarial predictions from the CEA’s internal actuary and finance
departments.189 Independent rate-setting and limited premium and deductible
ranges ensure uniformity and ease of access for would-be insureds seeking
earthquake coverage.
There exists a debate as to the efficacy of the CEA in meaningfully
increasing the number of earthquake policyholders within its state.190 In an
overview presented to Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business, CEA’s
general counsel noted that “statewide take-up [also known as policy
adoption] plummeted after CEA’s start-up.”191 However, over a ten-year
period from 2006-2016, the number of CEA policies in force grew by nearly
181. Id. at 81–82 (“The offer must state the proposed dwelling, contents, and additional
living expense limits; the deductible, and the estimated annual premium.”).
182. Id. at 82 (noting, however, Kentucky’s regulatory “preference” that such offers be
made to policyholders regularly but noting no statutory requirement exists).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 84.
185. Id. at 94.
186. See id. at 94–95.
187. Id. at 97 fig.8.
188. Id. at 105. As of 2016, deductibles are available at 5%, 20%, and 25% of the overall
coverage limit. Id.
189. Id. at 113.
190. Id. at 96 (“The question of why so many fewer households buy earthquake
insurance today, 20+ years after Northridge is frequently posed . . . .”).
191. DANIEL MARSHALL, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICY BRIEF NO. 17-03, AN OVERVIEW
OF THE CALIFORNIA E ARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY 5 (Feb. 2017), https://media.rff.org/
documents/RFF-PB-17-03.pdf [hereinafter MARSHALL, RFF POLICY BRIEF].
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200,000 insureds, with 931,589 Californians insured under a CEA policy in
2016.192
B. The Oklahoma Earthquake Authority as a Legislative Solution
Because Oklahoma now experiences earthquakes more frequently than
California,193 the legislature should follow the lead of the CEA to protect its
citizens. Today, Oklahoma is undeniably an earthquake-prone state, and the
time is past due for its legislators to treat it as such. While the day may come,
especially with increasingly frequent climate disasters,194 for a larger federalbased disaster insurance program, Oklahoma can begin to confront its issues
now at the state level.195
First, the Oklahoma legislature should require, not merely allow, insurers
within the state to offer earthquake coverage both at the sale and annual/biannual renewal of coverage. As discussed, this straightforward law is the
simple, but unique, underpinning of the CEA and California’s approach to
earthquake insurance regulation more generally.196 While Oklahoma has not
yet experienced its own Northridge quake, 197 there is a similar dysfunction
across the state’s earthquake insurance market that requires vigorous
legislative intervention in line with California’s novel concept. The
legislature could even create the Authority with a possible sun-setting
window to gain wider support, citing the recent decrease in earthquakes
192. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
193. Ehrman, supra note 11, at 612.
194. How
Can
Climate
Change
Affect
Natural
Disasters?,
USGS,
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qtnews_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) (noting the
likelihood of increased natural disasters “with increasing global surface temperatures”).
195. The federal government already supplements the private insurance market in one
area where insurers had trouble containing risk: flood insurance. See Noel King & Nick
Fountain, Episode 797: Flood Money, NPR (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:36 PM ET), https://www.npr.
org/sections/money/2017/09/29/554603161/episode-797-flood-money.
196. California’s compulsory earthquake insurance offer law passed in 1984. While some
recognized its general usefulness, scholars at the time were quick to note that the law, in and
of itself, did not sufficiently protect Californian’s from earthquake market irregularities. See
generally Jeffrey B. Hare, Comment, Earthquake Insurance: A Proposal for Compulsory
Coverage, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (1984).
197. Though many of Oklahoma’s earthquakes cause little damage, “[t]he earthquake
severity hazard will be high for the next several years because of the energy in those fault
systems from previous, historical wastewater injection,” per the Oklahoma Geological
Survey. Ken Miller, Damage Reported After Earthquakes in Oklahoma, FOX NEWS (Mar. 5,
2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/damage-reported-after-earthquakes-in-oklahoma
(quoting Jacob Walter, seismologist with the Oklahoma Geological Survey).
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consistent with fewer wastewater wells.198 With earthquakes established as a
regular part of Oklahoman life, citizens in the state should have adequate
protection against the relatively new risks they encounter, not just by choice
of insurers, but through legal mandate.
Second, Oklahoma needs to establish its own version of the CEA to better
protect its citizens and provide for a more stable and predictable market for
earthquake insurance.199 As the CEA general counsel explained in the report
referenced above, the California model should not remain a novelty to that
state alone; its principles and foundations remain “transferable and
practicable.”200 It is past time for Oklahoma to transfer these practicable
lessons to its own insurance market.
Many, if not perhaps all, of the issues noted (unpaid claims, untrained
adjustors, and non-competitive markets) in this Comment and by the
Oklahoma Insurance Department could be proactively addressed through an
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority. Oklahoma earthquake insurers have created
a “noncompetitive” marketplace with few options and high premiums.201 An
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, following the California model, would
offer earthquake policies subject to consistent and controlled rates and
premiums. Oklahoma earthquake insurers have created ambiguity as to
whether their policies cover human-made or induced quakes.202 An
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, following the California Model, could offer
clear and uniform definitions, tailored to Oklahoman concerns. Almost as if
the CEA anticipated an application to Oklahomans and induced quakes, CEA
policies rely on definitions created by the state government’s head geologist,
not insurers themselves.203

198. Oklahoma earthquakes registering a 3.0 or greater have decreased commensurate
with a regulatory tightening of wastewater injection. Oklahoma Earthquakes Decrease for
3rd Straight Year, AP NEWS (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/216ddc7f8391467
c90bd526696beb4f3.
199. Under the CEA, Californians still often choose to forego earthquake insurance. Still,
the CEA creates a more affordable and regulated marketplace. See Liz Pulliam Weston,
Rethinking Your Stance on Earthquake Coverage, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2000, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-feb-25-fi-2645-story.html; see also Andrew
Blankstein & Monica Alba, Why Do So Few California Homeowners Have Earthquake
Insurance, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 8:28 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
investigations/why-do-so-few-california-homeowners-have-earthquake-insurance-n227711.
200. MARSHALL, RFF POLICY BRIEF, supra note 191, at 6.
201. See supra Section I.B.
202. See supra Section I.B.
203. Marshall, Overview Article, supra note 174, at 105.
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Within an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, these definitions could pay
particular notice to induced quakes and their underlying causes.204 A single,
precise definition of “earthquake” could similarly dispel disagreements over
“ground settlement” versus “earthquake” and mandate the inclusion of
induced quakes in policies upfront, rather than retroactively as the Oklahoma
Insurance Commissioner has required.205 Earthquake policies offered through
an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority would also help ease market tensions for
private insurers by mandating the offer of uniform, state-managed policies.
Similarly, an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority could better regulate
earthquake insurers in conjunction with the Oklahoma Insurance Department.
Under the control of an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority modelled after
the CEA, all private insurers would be required to be a “participating
insurer.”206 For the state to recognize a participating insurer, the CEA
requires all insurers to enter into an “Insurer Participation Agreement”
between the insurer and the California Insurance Commissioner. 207
Oklahoma, under its own Earthquake Authority, should do the very same,
essentially creating a heightened and earthquake-specific form of its
insurance licensure requirements. It is here that the Oklahoma equivalent of
the CEA could work hand-in-glove with the OID. As discussed, the
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner retains control over insurer rules and
regulations.208 Through the OID, the Commissioner could impose
earthquake-specific requirements, like the CEA’s, onto Oklahoman
insurers.209
Most pertinently for Oklahomans, the CEA mandates claims-handling
requirements for its adjustors, which seem to address some of the concerns
that the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner has outlined.210 Claims
representatives under the CEA are required to be trained according to CEA
204. The Oklahoma Geological Survey (OGS) has dedicated a significant amount of
scholarship to the circumstances surrounding wastewater induced quakes. The OGS could
excellently provide these definitions. See Okla. Geological Survey, Statement on Oklahoma
Seismicity (Apr. 21, 2015), http://wichita.ogs.ou.edu/documents/OGS_StatementEarthquakes-4-21-15.pdf.
205. See supra Section II.A.
206. See For Insurers: Helping Financially Protect Californians from Damaging
Earthquakes, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/InsuranceProfessionals/For-Insurers (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
207. Id.
208. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018).
209. The Insurance Commissioner maintains the ability to adopt rules and regulations
pertaining to the Oklahoma Insurance Code. Id.
210. See supra Section II.A.
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claim-handling guidelines and the California version of the UCSPA.211
Among other requirements, “[t]he CEA requires every [participating insurer]
to comply with the California Department of Insurance regulations that set
forth standards governing the training of insurance adjusters in evaluating
damage caused by earthquakes and the procedures for reporting unaccredited
adjusting.”212 Within the CEA claims-handling guidelines itself, the CEA
encourages insurers to train its adjusters on the difference between
earthquake damage and other forms of property damage, as well as outlining
the specifics of the state’s UCSPA.213 The Oklahoma Insurance Department
could monitor compliance with these requirements through its existing
agency and market conduct review process.214 An Oklahoma Earthquake
Authority would address and more definitely prevent issues of earthquake
insurance already recognized in the state, while mandating that they do not
recur in the future.
To guarantee that participating insurers are following CEA guidelines,
California requires insurance adjustors to adhere to the Consortium of
Universities for Research in Earthquake Engineering (CUREE) guidelines in
adjusting claims.215 This thorough CUREE earthquake damage inspection
checklist ensures that adjustors are checking and noting issues of topography,
geotechnical issues, wall leaning, foundation cracking, and fireplace cracking
among its thirty-four required questions.216 To this point, the CEA requires a
completed CUREE checklist as part of a “complete investigation” into claims

211. For Insurers: Helping Financially Protect Californians from Damaging
Earthquakes, supra note 206.
212. Earthquake Event Reference Document for California Earthquake Authority
Participating Insurer Claims Liaison(s), CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., https://www.
earthquakeauthority.com/Insurance-Professionals/For-Adjusters/CEA-PI-Claim-LiaisonReference-Document-2018.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
213. CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., CLAIM MANUAL 11–12 (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/Insurance-Professionals/For-Adjusters/CEA-ClaimManual-1-1-2016 [hereinafter CLAIM MANUAL].
214. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 311.4 (Supp. 2018).
215. CLAIM MANUAL, supra note 213, at 62. CUREE is a non-profit comprised of more
than twenty-five universities with the “goal of advancing earthquake engineering research
and engaging in outreach efforts to develop STEM-related educational resources to benefit
the public as well as the next generation of engineers.” See About CUREE, CUREE,
http://www.curee.org/archive/organization.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
216. General Earthquake Damage Inspection Checklist, CUREE, https://www.
curee.org/projects/EDA/docs/EDA-F2-rev1.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). The checklist
covers a near-exhaustive inspection of a home, and asks for additional notes and
photographs documenting any damage that an adjustor may find. Id.
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with earthquake damage.217 Because Oklahoma does not mandate this
requirement as California currently does, there is presumably no demand that
Oklahoma adjustors follow the instructions of the CUREE checklist. When
insurers adjust claims in Oklahoma, there is no requirement to abide by a
proscribed checklist even if compliance with that checklist would otherwise
constitute claims-handling best practices.
The specificity of this checklist and its mandatory nature highlight the
extent to which the CEA, and a potential Oklahoman counterpart, can ensure
uniformity and consistency in the earthquake claims handling process. 218
Moreover, the Oklahoma Insurance Department could work with CUREE to
better tailor this checklist to Oklahoma-specific concerns (accounting for clay
soil, wastewater induced quakes, etc.). This itemized checklist, in itself,
would not entirely cure the worries of Oklahoma’s earthquake insurance
market. If California, a state with even fewer quakes than Oklahoma,219 finds
these criteria necessary, then Oklahoma should too.
The Oklahoma legislature maintains the ability to follow California and
protect its citizens from a market that it already knows to be faulty and often
unhelpful to those with earthquake insurance. An Oklahoma Earthquake
Authority would be able to offer Oklahomans a more affordable, basic form
of earthquake insurance than currently available, while ensuring that such a
policy remains appropriately priced and rated. Moreover, the Oklahoma
Earthquake Authority would be able to work in tandem with the state’s
Insurance Department to prevent existing abuses from recurring by
mandating heightened requirements on all insurers that would wish to serve
as a participating insurer in the Authority. It remains to be seen if the
Oklahoma legislature will ever consider this sweeping reform, or is even
aware of such a statutory scheme.220 The results from the CEA partnered with

217. CLAIM MANUAL, supra note 213, at 62.
218. See id. The CEA Manual even notes that “[u]se of the CUREE inspection checklist
ensures consistent and complete inspections by all the CEA participating insurance
companies.” Id.
219. See Oklahoma Now Has More Earthquakes on a Regular Basis Than California.
Are They Due to Fracking?, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/oklahoma-now-has-moreearthquakes-a-regular-basis-california-are-they-due-fracking?qtnews_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
220. Oklahoma State Senator Clark Jolley has proposed a government reinsurance
program modeled after the CEA, but it seems to lack the exacting regulations and statewritten policies of the CEA. Lyle Adriano, Oklahoma Considers “California-Style”
Approach to Earthquake Insurance, INS. BUS. AM. (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.
insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/oklahoma-considers-californiastyle-
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the recognized flaws in the Oklahoma earthquake insurance market make
clear, however, that the state and its citizens would be well-served by the
formation of an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority.
IV. Conclusion
Many Oklahomans and their insurers alike presumably never expected the
state to become the national epicenter of earthquakes and seismic activity.
Indeed, the state and its citizens are accustomed to taking shelter during
tornado season and fearing catastrophic wind and hail damage to their
property,221 but few could have predicted the frequency and extent of the
threat now existing beneath their homes’ foundations. The fact remains,
however, that despite the near-universal recognition of the cause of the state’s
earthquake phenomenon,222 earthquake insurers in Oklahoma still fail to
provide their policyholders with adequate coverage to protect against this
newer risk.
In the near term, earthquake policyholders whose insurers have
wrongfully-denied their claim due to an unsubstantiated policy exemption
should band together in taking their fight to the insurers through doctrine of
illusory coverage.223 Through this litigation strategy, policyholders can
compel insurers to honor their policy and eliminate the most contemptible
avenues for excuses and non-payments. More effective and rigid regulation
from the Oklahoma Insurance Department can clarify the expectations
between insurers and policyholders and bolster enforcement efforts. By
realizing the full power of the Insurance Commissioner and the UCSPA, the
state’s regulatory body can set a clear standard for how earthquake insurers
should treat consumers and handle claims. Finally, though it is a substantial
legislative overhaul to be sure, the state legislature should form an Oklahoma
Earthquake Authority to both offer affordable coverage to all Oklahomans
and further establish comprehensive expectations for insurers. As the ground
beneath Oklahomans’ feet continues to shift, these measures through
litigation, regulation, and legislation can meaningfully assure those with
earthquake damage that their insurers will honor the terms and spirit of their
approach-to-earthquake-insurance-28742.aspx. No legislation in Oklahoma based on these
other CEA features is apparent at the time of this writing.
221. See Scott Neuman, A Brief History of Oklahoma Tornadoes, NPR (May 20, 2013,
7:06 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/05/20/185613204/a-briefhistory-of-oklahoma-tornadoes (“Kansas and Oklahoma rank at the top [of all U.S. states]
for tornadoes per square mile.”).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 7–25 (Introduction).
223. See supra Section I.B.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7

2020]

COMMENTS

997

coverage. Meanwhile, the state’s citizens can do what they have done time
and time again: rebuild.
Nick A. Marr
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